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INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank is to
achieve and maintain price stability. Price stability is not a
virtue in itself: this objective stems from the consideration
that monetary policy can best contribute to maximising social
welfare and promoting economic growth by achieving price
stability. The medium-term inflation target plays a key role in
the MNB’s inflation-targeting framework, as the Monetary
Council determines the monetary policy course in order to
ensure that the inflation target is met on the time horizon
relevant for policy. It is therefore crucial that the inflation
target set by the authorities is as close as possible to a level of
inflation which is optimal for the economy in question.
The article provides an overview of the issues considered in
defining the inflation target which was revised by the
Hungarian monetary authorities this year. According to the
theoretical results, inflation above the optimal level imposes
considerable costs on society. Despite this, however, the
optimal rate of inflation is not zero, as there are a number of
considerations which call for a small, positive rate of
inflation. Part of the empirical literature tests for this ‘non-
linearity’ between inflation and economic growth, i.e. it
measures whether there is a threshold level, above which the
costs of inflation will outweigh the benefits. The studies
presented in the article reinforce the notion that there is
indeed such a threshold. Above this level, it can be
demonstrated that inflation leads to a significant loss in
economic growth.
The article also examines the variety of targets set by other
central banks within a best practice inflation-targeting
regime, as well as the targets adopted by countries at similar
stages of development which share common structural
features with Hungary, for example, the Visegrád countries.
Concentrating on these aspects and taking into account
unique factors (those specific to Hungary) that may influence
the optimal rate of inflation, we can define an optimal
inflation target for the Hungarian economy.
THEORETICAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE
OPTIMAL LEVEL OF INFLATION
In searching for the rate of inflation which ensures the
highest level of social welfare for an economy, the factors
that may make inflation costly must be taken into account.
Therefore, in the following we present the so-called static
and dynamic (measurable in terms of output sacrifice) welfare
costs of inflation. However, other considerations which claim
that small positive inflation is preferable may also exist. For
this reason, we will discuss such arguments in greater detail
in the second part of this chapter.
Economic agents are directly faced with static welfare losses
of inflation in a high inflation environment. The so-called
menu costs are the direct costs of physically changing
nominal prices. Because the costs of adjusting prices are not
negligible, firms change their prices less frequently than
would be justified and, consequently, price and wage
rigidities may develop. This, in turn, leads to a welfare loss,
as firms are unable to adjust to the shocks that they receive in
a proper and timely fashion.
In an inflationary environment, prices undergo more
frequent changes, which makes it more difficult for economic
agents to compare prices and, ultimately, to make optimal
decisions. Prices carry important information about the
economy. In a high inflation environment, it is more difficult
to find out whether the price of a good has changed in
relation to that of another (which would then lead to a
reallocation of resources), or if its price has simply adjusted
to the inflation environment (which would not cause such a
reallocation).
This article discusses the main factors considered in defining the country’s inflation target which was revised this year. Three
key issues are covered: the theoretical and empirical literature dealing with the optimal level of inflation, international best
practice and individual, country-specific factors that may justify deviation in any direction from best practice. The article finds
that the 3% inflation target set by the MNB is consistent with all the three aspects reviewed and, consequently, contributes to
the MNB achieving its primary statutory objective of price stability.
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the Hungarian perspectiveShoe-leather costs of inflation relate to the phenomenon that,
with higher inflation, the costs of holding money increase
and, consequently, agents strive to hold less of it. An
explanation for this is that cash required for conducting
transactions entails cost of time. In addition, it is also
conceivable that demand will fall, as agents would like to
reduce the number of transactions made at these higher
prices.
Inflation results in a welfare loss to society through the tax
regime in numerous ways. First, in most cases the base for
taxes payable on various incomes is determined by some sort
of nominal quantity (e.g. nominal income in the case of
personal income tax, and nominal return in the case of
capital income). This means that, given a constant level of
real income and high inflation, the tax burden increases.
This, in turn, adds to the dead-weight loss caused by the
distortions of the tax regime. Another channel relates to
accounting for depreciation. As the amount of depreciation
deductible under law is also defined in nominal terms, in a
high inflation environment there may be a shift in fixed
investment activity towards projects of a shorter economic
lifespan, to the detriment of projects with a longer lifespan.
High inflation increases the risk premia on financial
investments. This effect is evident at both the micro and
macro levels. Considering the micro level, economic agents
require a higher return in exchange for the higher risks that
they take. The extra return required relative to the risk-free
interest rate is called risk premium. In a high inflation
environment, uncertainty surrounding future inflation also
increases and, consequently, financial investors demand an
inflation risk premium of some sort. A higher expected return
will lead to a decline in investment activity, as fewer projects
pay off at a higher real interest rate. At the macro level, it is
widespread practice in closely integrated financial markets
for investors and credit rating agencies to judge the
creditworthiness of a given country based on a set of chosen
macroeconomic indicators. Price stability is ascribed an
important role in this process – investors will expect a higher
risk premium if inflation is higher.
The dynamic cost of inflation is evident through the fact that
persistently high inflation reduces the rate of economic
growth through various channels. In a comprehensive survey
of the literature, Temple (2000) reviewed the channels
through which inflation negatively affects economic growth.
He found that inflation has the greatest effect on growth by
impeding investment activity.
These examples clearly illustrate that high inflation imposes
severe, immediate and future cost burdens on economic
agents; consequently, achieving and maintaining price
stability significantly improves the long-term welfare of
members of society. The above discussion could lead one to
infer that price stability, i.e. zero inflation is the optimal
inflation target. There are, however, some considerations
which may justify small positive rates of inflation. Basically,
three arguments can be put forward in favour of positive
inflation: the distortion in the price index, the need to avoid
the danger of deflation, and asymmetric price rigidities.
During the recent period, the academic literature has not
only attempted to document these effects extensively, it has
also sought to measure empirically the rates of positive
inflation justified by the various effects. The results are
discussed below.
First, the consumer price index is the most widely used
measure of inflation. Experience has shown, however, that
the CPI often contains a certain amount of distortion and,
moreover, it tends to slightly overestimate actual inflation.
The method of calculating the average is predisposed to
introduce an upward bias into the price index;
1 the greater
the bias, the more dispersed the changes in the prices of
goods are. Moreover, as the consumer price index is
calculated on the basis of a fixed representative consumption
basket, it does not take into account the fact that consumers
substitute away from more expensive goods towards cheaper
ones in response to movements in relative prices. In addition,
individuals can choose not only between goods, but also
between shops and, therefore, retail prices should be
weighted according to the shops where purchases have been
made in a given period. But prices are always registered in the
same shops. And, finally, using a fixed consumption basket
implicitly assumes that the quality of goods are held constant
over time. However, product quality tends to improve and,
consequently, the portion of changes in prices justified by
quality improvement feeds through into higher inflation. In a
comprehensive survey of the empirical literature for a
number of countries, the IMF estimated the consumer price
index bias to be between 0.5%-1.0%, i.e. actual inflation
tended to be lower by this margin than observed inflation
(Faulkner–MacDonagh et al., 2003).
Avoiding deflation is the second argument in favour of small
positive inflation. Although, as we saw earlier, inflation
involves numerous costs, economists believe that deflation is
much more harmful. This is well illustrated by the example
of Japan in the 1990s. If prices begin to fall, economic agents
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1This distortion results from the fact that inflation is defined as the weighted arithmetic average of changes in the prices of goods comprising the consumption basket.
If the price of a product rises by HUF 1 in year 1, and falls by HUF 1 in year 2, then the indicator will show slightly positive inflation on the average of the two years.will postpone consumption, in the expectation that prices
will continue to fall into the future.
2 The decline in prices
and the contraction in demand may trigger a so-called
deflationary spiral, where the two processes, mutually
reinforcing each other, generate an ever deeper recession. 
A deflationary environment may also undermine the
efficiency of monetary policy. As the nominal interest rate
cannot be negative (given that the return on money is zero),
it may be the case that the real interest rate would have to
fall further, but there is no room left. This situation is called
a liquidity trap. Central banks take great care to protect the
economy from prolonged deflation and to escape liquidity
traps. They can achieve this goal mainly by setting inflation
targets above zero. Empirical research has found that, with a
1%-2% average inflation rate in advanced economies, the
probability of deflation and a liquidity trap developing is
acceptably low.
The third reason why positive inflation is preferred to zero
inflation is found in the theory of asymmetric nominal price
and wage rigidities. This idea is based on the notion that the
economy continuously receives exogenous shocks which
encourage economic agents to adjust (e.g. to change prices
and wages). For some reason, it is easier to raise prices or
wages than to reduce them. As a consequence, the number of
price and wage cuts will lag behind that of price and wage
rises. Downwardly rigid prices or wages tend to weaken the
economy’s ability to adjust, and in this way cause an
efficiency loss. If this suggestion is empirically relevant, then
a small positive rate of inflation will help the economy to
continue growing steadily. In other words, with a small
positive inflation, economic adjustment may occur more
easily in real terms, as, with inflation above zero, fewer
companies would have to reduce their prices or wages.
The results of empirical research on downwardly rigid prices
in advanced economies are slightly contradictory. While
Peltzmann (2000) found for the US that asymmetry is present
across most sectors, research carried out in the euro area
established that prices are not overly rigid downwards
(Dhyne et al., 2005).
3
In contrast, the survey results available for downwardly rigid
wages are much more robust. Employee resistance to
nominal wage cuts is basically linked to money illusion and
to the notion that, to a certain degree, employees prefer not
too wide wage differences in similar jobs (Akerlof–Dickens–
Perry, 1996). Surveys conducted among corporate managers
have shown that management takes into account resistance
to wage cuts in setting employees’ wages (Bewley, 1999). In
their experience, wage cuts reduce employee performance;
consequently, in certain cases they are better off if they fire
the employee. The International Wage Flexibility Project
(IWFP) compares nominal wage rigidities based on standard
indicators (Dickens et al., 2006); and the series of research
projects by the Wage Dynamic Network, established by the
ECB, is currently underway. Based on the results of
empirical research, the degree of nominal wage rigidity
exhibits significant dispersion across countries. This
dispersion may be explained by the different labour market
institutions (e.g. the importance of trade unions) and by the
differences in employee preferences. Using the empirical
results, a couple of studies (Fahr–Smets, 2008; and
Fagan–Messina, 2008) analysed the optimal level of inflation
with asymmetrical nominal wage rigidities in a general
equilibrium model framework. Based on the calculations,
downward nominal wage rigidities raise the level of optimal
inflation by 0-2 percentage points, depending on the
strength of the rigidities.
The theoretical considerations presented so far have dealt
with the costs of inflation, as well as with the arguments in
favour of a small, positive level of inflation. These two
opposing influences are called ‘grease and sand’ effects in the
academic literature. It implies that small positive inflation is
conducive to steady economic growth (particularly if
asymmetric nominal price or wage rigidities are relevant),
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2 In the strict sense, this statement is true if real wages rise, i.e. if the fall in prices is not followed by a decline in nominal wages of similar magnitude. As we will see later,
there is serious theoretical and empirical evidence in favour of downwardly rigid wages.
3 It is important to note that it is not necessarily downwardly rigid wages that are in the background of less frequent price reductions compared with price increases.
Examples for this are Tsiddon (1993) and Ball–Mankiw (1994).offsets the distortions of the consumer price index and
reduces the risk of deflation. Above a certain level, however,
it is the costs of inflation that become dominant, and from
that point inflation causes a welfare loss and reduces the
long-term rate of economic growth. Due to these
considerations, optimal inflation can be found where the
costs and the benefits of positive inflation balance out. Chart
1 plots this non-linear relationship.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON OPTIMAL
INFLATION
The key proposition of the theoretical literature discussed in
the previous section can be summarised as follows. The
relationship between inflation and social welfare is not linear.
This means that, to a certain level, inflation has a positive,
greasing effect on the economy. Above this level, however, the
costs become dominant, and inflation will cause significant
damage to society. The optimal level of inflation is where the
costs and benefits balance out. The empirical literature has
tested this proposition in two different approaches. Earlier
research mainly concentrated on demonstrating the damaging
effects of high inflation, and in particular on quantifying the
dynamic costs (measurable in terms of output sacrifice). Above
and beyond demonstrating the general negative effects,
research has more recently analysed whether there is a
threshold level, above which inflation exerts a negative
influence and where this threshold level actually lies.
Both approaches have reinforced the prediction of the
theoretical literature. Early results showed that inflation
above the optimal level is indeed harmful to economic
growth. More recent research, in turn, has confirmed that the
relationship is not linear, i.e. that there is a threshold level.
Before giving a detailed account of the results, it is useful to
look at some methodological problems.
One of the most important tasks for empirical analysts is to
find persuasive evidence that the relationship discovered
between the two variables is more than a correlation, and that
there is indeed a causal relationship in the background. In
this particular case, this means that if we identify a negative
correlation between inflation and growth, it does not
necessarily imply that inflation has a harmful effect on
growth. It could be the case, for example, that there is a
negative supply shock in the background that raises inflation
and simultaneously slows the rate of economic growth. If
such exogenous shocks are dominant in the relationship
between inflation and growth, it may be the case that the
results are based on a spurious regression.
Problems such as this are especially serious in estimating
growth equations and, therefore well thought-over,
sophisticated estimation methods are required to test the
assumed relationship in a convincing way. In addition, as
discussed in detail in the previous section, the question of
linearity is a key issue in estimating the effect of inflation on
growth, which increases the complexity of the problem. If we
erroneously estimate a linear relationship, the results will be
downward biased (Ghosh–Phillips, 1998). We will see that
this key factor proves crucial in evaluating the results.
Consequently, it is important to always bear in mind the
potential shortcomings of the methodology used.
Early studies succeeded in identifying a significant negative
relationship between inflation and economic growth. For
example, Barro (1995) found that a 10 percentage point rise
in inflation reduces the rate of per capita real income growth
by 0.2-0.3 percentage points.  The author also estimated the
relationship with regards to the rate of investment, where a
10 percentage point rise in inflation reduced the investment
rate by 0.4-0.6 percentage points. This confirms Temple’s
(2000) theoretical result, according to which the investment
rate is an important channel through which inflation exerts
its negative influence.
A common problem with these studies is that the results are
very sensitive to the choice of sample. In other words, the
posited relationship exists only if the sample contains
observations of episodes of relatively high inflation. For
example, in Barro’s study the results are not significant, if
observations of inflation above 50% per year are eliminated
from the sample. In the authors’ judgement, lower inflation
data themselves do not contain sufficient information to
clearly isolate the relationship between inflation and growth
(Barro, 1995). One of the most important criticisms against
investigations based on this kind of methodology is that it
assumes a linear relationship between inflation and growth,
whereas there are strong theoretical arguments in favour of a
non-linear relationship.
Although we have succeeded in demonstrating that high
(double-digit) rates of inflation indeed cause significant
damage to growth, the interesting question is whether or not
more moderate inflation causes a loss in output. Due in part
to the doubts raised about earlier investigations, more recent
research has explicitly tested the ‘non-linearity’ hypothesis.
The starting point has been that the reason why earlier
investigations may have been unable to demonstrate the
assumed relationship at more moderate levels of inflation was
that they did not take into account the non-linearity which
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4 See also Fischer (1993), or Bruno–Easterly (1998).introduced a downward bias into the estimation (Ghosh–
Phillips, 1998).
Empirical results have confirmed this criticism, as more
recent investigations have succeeded in confirming the
theoretical predictions from two aspects.
5 First, it has been
proven that the relationship between inflation and economic
growth is, in fact, not linear, i.e. all of the empirical
investigations that we have discussed above have found a
threshold in the relationship between inflation and growth.
So, the ‘grease and sand’ effects of inflation, noted earlier,
hold; small positive inflation may be a factor contributing to
steady economic growth. Above a certain level, however,
costs become dominant.
Second, these investigations identify a negative relationship
between the two variables even at much lower levels of
inflation. This means that the threshold level, above which
the costs of inflation become dominant, can be found at
single-digit inflation rates in all of the studies reviewed. With
respect to advanced economies, the studies that we have
surveyed found this threshold level at different levels of
inflation, due to the different methodologies applied, the
different cross-country sample, and the analysis of different
periods. Some studies have found this threshold within the
group of advanced economies at 1%, others at 8%. This,
however, does not mean that an inflation target can be
chosen arbitrarily from this range for a number of reasons.
First, these studies have only taken into account output loss
as the cost of inflation. As we saw in the previous section,
however, inflation does not only have dynamic welfare costs
– we have also demonstrated numerous, significant static
welfare costs. These studies have not explicitly taken into
account such costs and, therefore, it is wise to choose an
inflation target from among the lower values.
Second, the investigations have generally identified an
asymmetric non-linear relationship between inflation and
growth. Although all analyses have found that inflation above
the threshold level clearly has a negative effect on growth,
generally there is no demonstrable positive relationship
between inflation and growth below the threshold level, i.e.
the results are not significant.
6 This means that there is a lower
probability that a central bank will face considerable real
economic costs by setting an excessively low value as its
inflation target, compared to a central bank that determines its
target at an excessively high level. Consequently, it is wise to
choose one of the lower values to be the inflation target.
Finally, different countries exhibit significant differences
both in terms of structural features and in their level of
development. Therefore, the studies discussed in this article
reveal a general rather than a country-specific relationship;
the threshold level is not equal to an inflation target relevant
for every country. In setting the inflation target, country-
specific and structural features must be taken into account
which would justify some deviation from international best
practice. In the case of Hungary, we will discuss these factors
in the final section. 
But first we will present another type of empirical evidence:
targets adopted by other central banks. Before discussing the
country-specific factors that should be taken into account in
the case of Hungary, we must know what is best practice
inflation-targeting. The next section explores this issue.
INFLATION TARGETS IN OTHER
COUNTRIES
As we saw earlier, inflation exceeding the optimal level
causes significant costs to society. The empirical and
theoretical literature serves as useful guidance with respect to
the optimal level of inflation; however, it may also be useful
to expand our knowledge through studying a different kind
of empirical evidence. As was mentioned above, the inflation
target set by other central banks provide an important point
of reference. 
Currently, 24 central banks pursue an inflation target. Some
central banks which do not use an explicit inflation target
also communicate a numerical value for inflation they
consider to be consistent with price stability. Chart 2 plots
the inflation targets of central banks that have adopted an
inflation-targeting regime, with the targets in ascending
order. Central banks targeting a band have been arranged
according to the middle of the target band for inflation. 
In the countries considered to be best practice, i.e. in the
United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden and New Zealand, the
inflation target is 2%, except in New Zealand, where an
interval between 1%-3% has been set as a band. Looking at
economies at a similar stage of development to Hungary, for
example, the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Poland
and Slovakia) in our geographical vicinity, we find that the
targets do not significantly deviate from the Hungarian
target. These countries have set inflation targets of 3%, 2.5%
and 2%, respectively. Finally, the practice adopted by the
European Central Bank is very important for Hungary, due
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5The studies examined are: Ghosh-Phillips (1998), Khan-Senhadji (2001), and Burdhekin et al. (2004). Brook et al. (2002) also provide a good summary of the earlier and
also the more recent empirical literature.
6 A positive and significant relationship was found by Khan and Senhadji (2001) below the 1% threshold level. However, the results are not robust; when the frequency
of the data is changed, results are not significant .to the country’s prospective entry into ERM-II. Although the
ECB does not belong to the group of central banks pursuing
an explicit inflation target, its price stability objective of
inflation ‘below but close to 2%’ is a crucial point of
reference.
Based on the chart and in light of the foregoing, the
conclusion can be drawn that in the majority of countries
pursuing an inflation-targeting regime, central banks have set
the inflation target at around 2%-3%. 
SOME RESULTS RELEVANT FOR
HUNGARY
The previous two chapters confirm the view that a 3%
inflation target is in line with both the general guidance of
theory and international best practice. Beyond that, it is
worth considering whether a unique structural feature of the
Hungarian economy justifies significant deviation in the
inflation target. In this section we examine what level of
inflation is justified by the arguments in favour of positive
inflation, discussed in the section on theoretical issues. We
will see that there is no robust result which would justify a
significant difference in the inflation target compared to
international practice.
Any estimate for the distortion in the consumer price index is
fairly uncertain, as no empirical study on Hungary has been
written. General theoretical intuition and the empirical
investigations conducted in emerging economies have found
that in these countries the distortion in the CPI is greater than
in advanced economies.
7 A major reason for this is that the
introduction of new products and quality improvement have
a greater distorting effect. However, with progress made in
convergence, this effect is likely to diminish. In the case of
Hungary, we reason that the majority of changes, resulting
mainly from economic transition (introduction of new
products; market entry by multinational business chains and
hypermarkets; improvement in the quality of goods;
transformation of the consumption mix), which may have
significantly influenced the degree of distortion, have already
taken place. Nevertheless, the amount of distortion may be
slightly above 0.5-1 percentage point experienced in
advanced economies. 
Empirical results suggest that the 1%-2% inflation level
required in order to reduce the danger of deflation in
advanced economies is similar for emerging countries.
Analysing the experience of emerging and transition
economies within the inflation-targeting framework, Amato-
Gerlach (2002) found that, although economic shocks are
generally greater in these countries, real interest rates are
higher and, therefore, they do not see any reason to adjust
the inflation target upwards. An IMF study on deflation risk
(Faulkner–MacDonagh et al., 2003) organised countries into
four groups with respect to the risk of deflation. They judged
riskiness on the basis of various price indices, indicators of
inflation expectations, measures of the output gap, asset
prices and various money market indicators. The CEE region
was only represented by Poland in the sample, with a placing
in the low-risk group. 
Examining asymmetric nominal price rigidities, Gábriel and
Reiff (2008) found that the number of price reductions is
not significantly lower than the number of price rises,
similarly to the euro area, i.e. there is no evidence of
significant downward price rigidity. With respect to
asymmetric nominal wage rigidities, the available results are
scarce. In this case, the following aspects should be taken
into account in comparison with advanced economies. (1)
Productivity growth is faster in Hungary than in the euro
area. As a result, assuming the same average inflation rates,
Hungarian wages may grow faster. So, the average of the
distribution of wage adjustments will be higher and,
consequently, the cost caused by nominal wage rigidity
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Chart 2














































































































































































































Sources: Websites of central banks.
* Based on a decision taken in spring 2007, the inflation target will be set
at 2% from January 2010.
Note: Data for Turkey and Korea are for 2007. In the case of South Africa
and Thailand, the target is not the consumer price index, but core
inflation. For this reason, the targets have been adjusted by the difference
between average the CPI and core inflation in the past 7 years, for the sake
of comparability.
7 Filho–Chamon (2007) found a 3 percentage point distortion for Mexico and a 1.5-3 percentage point distortion for Brazil. Filer-Hanousek (2000) also found a 3
percentage point distortion for the Czech Republic. However, Podpiera (2003) estimated the error in the Czech Republic consumer price index to be between -0.83
and 0.5 percentage points.lower. (2) Firms must adjust to much greater shocks than
euro-area member countries, due to the fact that Hungary is
a transition economy. This is why the distribution of wage
adjustments is much wider, which, in turn, increases the
costs involved in nominal wage rigidity. (3) The degree of
nominal wage rigidity (i.e. the percentage of employees
potentially affected by rigidity whose wages will not
change) is smaller than in the euro area, which is an
advantage with respect to the relative costs of wage rigidity
(Analysis of the Convergence Process, 2008, MNB). 
Based on these considerations, it can be seen that the factors
do not point in the same direction and, consequently, it is
difficult to judge whether the costs of nominal wage rigidity
are lower or higher in Hungary than in the euro area,
assuming the same average inflation rate. Research into wage
rigidities, involving European countries and coordinated by
the ECB, is currently underway. Preliminary results of the
project suggest that in Hungary, nominal wage rigidities do
not justify a higher inflation target than the levels typical in
more advanced economies. 
CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the optimal inflation target for Hungary
from three different perspectives. First, we analysed what
guidance is offered by the theoretical and empirical literature.
The theoretical results suggest that the relationship between
inflation and welfare is not linear. Small positive inflation
contributes to the smooth functioning of the economy. Above
a certain level, however, static and dynamic welfare costs of
inflation will dominate and, consequently, the effect will be
negative. Optimal inflation can be found where costs and
benefits balance out. The empirical literature has confirmed
the assumption of ‘non-linearity’ and has demonstrated that
inflation in excess of the optimal level causes significant
damage to the economy. For advanced economies, some of
the studies analysed identified the threshold level at 1% while
others at 8%. It is important to note that the results have
been estimated on a sample including many countries and,
therefore, provide some kind of average. Consequently, they
are not necessarily authoritative for a given country with
unique structural features in defining the optimal rate of
inflation and the inflation target.
Based on this consideration, in the following section we
examined the issue in the context of international central
bank practice. We surveyed the inflation targets set by other
central banks and found that the majority of them choose a
low, 2%-3% target. Finally, we examined the various
considerations that might justify having a significantly
different inflation target. Taking into the account that
Hungary is a transition economy and other structural
features, we did not find evidence which would justify setting
a significantly different target in Hungary compared to
international practice. 
To summarise, the 3% inflation target is consistent with both
guidance provided by the theoretical and empirical literature
and international best practice. We found that there is no
country-specific factor in the case of Hungary which would
justify a significant deviation from best practice.
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